



SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COUR SUPÉRIEURE DE JUSTICE

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TOTAL PAGES (INCLUDING COVER PAGE): 16

MESSAGE:

Please see attached Reasons for Decision in Nelson Financial Group Ltd., 2010 ONSC 6229.

Please note that the Preferred Shareholders who addressed the Court will receive a hard copy of the attached Reasons via regular mail.

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CITATION: Nelson Financial Group Ltd., 2010 ONSC 6229

COURT FILE NO.: 10-8630-00CL

DATE: 20101116

ONTARIO

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,
R.S.C. 1985, C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE
OR ARRANGEMENT OF NELSON FINANCIAL GROUP LTD.

COUNSEL: *Richard B. Jones and Douglas Turner, Q.C.* Representative Counsel for
Noteholders/Moving Party
J.H. Grout and S. Aggarwal for the Monitor
Pamela Foy for the Ontario Securities Commission
Frank Lamie for Nelson Financial Group Ltd.
Robert Benjamin Mills and Harold Van Winssen for Clifford Styles, Jackie Styles
and Play Investments Ltd., Respondents
Michael Beardsley, Self Represented Respondent
Clifford Holland, Self Represented Respondent
Arnold Bolliger, Self Represented Respondent
John McVey, Self Represented Respondent
Joan Frederick, Self Represented Respondent
Rakesh Sharma, Self Represented Respondent
Larry Debono, Self Represented Respondent
Keith McClear, Self Represented Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

PEPALL J.

[1] This motion addresses the legal characterization of claims of holders of preferred shares in the capital stock of the applicant, Nelson Financial Group Ltd. ("Nelson"). The issue before me is to determine whether such claims constitute equity claims for the purposes of sections 6(8) and 22.1 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA").

Background Facts

[2] Nelson was incorporated pursuant to the *Business Corporations Act* of Ontario in September, 1990. Nelson raised money from investors and then used those funds to extend credit to customers in vendor assisted financing programmes. It raised money in two ways. It issued promissory notes bearing a rate of return of 12% per annum and also issued preference shares typically with an annual dividend of 10%.¹ The funds were then lent out at significantly higher rates of interest.

[3] The Monitor reported that Nelson placed ads in selected publications. The ads outlined the nature of the various investment options. Term sheets for the promissory notes or the preferred shares were then provided to the investors by Nelson together with an outline of the proposed tax treatment for the investment. No funds have been raised from investors since January 29, 2010.

(a) Noteholders

[4] As of the date of the *CCAA* filing on March 23, 2010, Nelson had issued 685 promissory notes in the aggregate principal amount of \$36,583,422.89. The notes are held by approximately 321 people.

(b) Preferred Shareholders

[5] Nelson was authorized to issue two classes of common shares and 2,800,000 Series A preferred shares and 2,000,000 Series B preferred shares, each with a stated capital of \$25.00.

¹ The Monitor is aware of six preferred shareholders with dividends that ranged from 10.5% to 13.75% per annum.

The president and sole director of Nelson, Marc Boutet, is the owner of all of the issued and outstanding common shares. By July 31, 2007, Nelson had issued to investors 176,675 Series A preferred shares for an aggregate consideration of \$4,416,925. During the subsequent fiscal year ended July 31, 2008, Nelson issued a further 172,545 Series A preferred shares and 27,080 Series B preferred shares. These shares were issued for an aggregate consideration of \$4,672,383 net of share issue costs.

[6] The preferred shares are non-voting and take priority over the common shares. The company's articles of amendment provide that the preferred shareholders are entitled to receive fixed preferential cumulative cash dividends at the rate of 10% per annum. Nelson had the unilateral right to redeem the shares on payment of the purchase price plus accrued dividends. At least one investor negotiated a right of redemption. Two redemption requests were outstanding as of the *CCAA* filing date.

[7] As of the *CCAA* filing date of March 23, 2010, Nelson had issued and outstanding 585,916.6 Series A and Series B preferred shares with an aggregate stated capital of \$14,647,914. The preferred shares are held by approximately 82 people. As of the date of filing of these *CCAA* proceedings, there were approximately \$53,632 of declared but unpaid dividends outstanding with respect to the preferred shares and \$73,652.51 of accumulated dividends.

[8] Investors subscribing for preferred shares entered into subscription agreements described as term sheets. These were executed by the investor and by Nelson. Nelson issued share certificates to the investors and maintained a share register recording the name of each preferred shareholder and the number of shares held by each shareholder.

[9] As reported by the Monitor, notwithstanding that Nelson issued two different series of preferred shares, the principal terms of the term sheets signed by the investors were almost identical and generally provided as follows:

- the issuer was Nelson;
- the par value was fixed at \$25.00;
- the purpose was to finance Nelson's business operations;
- the dividend was 10% per annum, payable monthly, commencing one month after the investment was made;
- preferred shareholders were eligible for a dividend tax credit;
- Nelson issued annual T-3 slips on account of dividend income to the preferred shareholders;
- the preferred shares were non-voting (except where voting as a class was required), redeemable at the option of Nelson and ranked ahead of common shares; and
- dividends were cumulative and no dividends were to be paid on common shares if preferred share dividends were in arrears.

[10] In addition, the Series B term sheet provided that the monthly dividend could be reinvested pursuant to a Dividend Reinvestment Plan ("DRIP").

[11] The preferred shareholders were entered on the share register and received share certificates. They were treated as equity in the company's financial statements. Dividends were received by the preferred shareholders and they took the benefit of the advantageous tax treatment.

(c) Insolvency

[12] Mr. Boutet knew that Nelson was insolvent since at least its financial year ended July 31, 2007. Nelson did not provide financial statements to any of the preferred shareholders prior to, or subsequent to, the making of the investment.

(d) Ontario Securities Commission

[13] On May 12, 2010, the Ontario Securities Commission ("OSC") issued a Notice of Hearing and Statement of Allegations alleging that Nelson and its affiliate, Nelson Investment Group Ltd., and various officers and directors of those corporations committed breaches of the *Ontario Securities Act* in the course of selling preferred shares. The allegations include non-compliance with the prospectus requirements, the sale of shares in reliance upon exemptions that were inapplicable, the sale of shares to persons who were not accredited investors, and fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations made in the course of the sale of shares. The OSC hearing has been scheduled for the end of February, 2011.

(e) Legal Opinion

[14] Based on the Monitor's review, the preferred shareholders were documented as equity on Nelson's books and records and financial statements. Pursuant to court order, the Monitor retained Stikeman Elliott LLP as independent counsel to provide an opinion on the characterization of the claims and potential claims of the preferred shareholders. The opinion concluded that the claims were equity claims. The Monitor posted the opinion on its website and also advised the preferred shareholders of the opinion and conclusions by letter. The opinion was not to constitute evidence, issue estoppel or res judicata with respect to any matters of fact or law referred to therein. The opinion, at least in part, informed Nelson's position which was

supported by the Monitor, that independent counsel for the preferred shareholders was unwarranted in the circumstances.

(f) Development of Plan

[15] The Monitor reported in its Eighth Report that a plan is in the process of being developed and that preferred shareholders would have their existing preference shares cancelled and would then be able to claim a tax loss on their investment or be given a new form of preference shares with rights to be determined.

Motion

[16] The holders of promissory notes are represented by Representative Counsel appointed pursuant to my order of June 15, 2010. Representative Counsel wishes to have some clarity as to the characterization of the preferred shareholders' claims. Accordingly, Representative Counsel has brought a motion for an order that all claims and potential claims of the preferred shareholders against Nelson be classified as equity claims within the meaning of the *CCAA*. In addition, Representative Counsel requests that the unsecured creditors, which include the noteholders, be entitled to be paid in full before any claim of a preferred shareholder and that the preferred shareholders form a separate class that is not entitled to vote at any meeting of creditors. Nelson and the Monitor support the position of Representative Counsel. The OSC is unopposed.

[17] On the return of the motion, some preferred shareholders were represented by counsel from Templeman Menninga LLP and some were self-represented. It was agreed that the letters and affidavits of preferred shareholders that were filed with the court would constitute their evidence. Oral submissions were made by legal counsel and by approximately eight individuals.

They had many complaints. Their allegations against Nelson and Mr. Boutet range from theft, fraud, misrepresentation including promises that their funds would be secured, operation of a Ponzi scheme, breach of trust, dividend payments to some that exceeded the rate set forth in Nelson's articles, conversion of notes into preferred shares at a time when Nelson was insolvent, non-disclosure, absence of a prospectus or offering memorandum disclosure, oppression, violation of section 23(3) of the *OBCA* and of the *Securities Act* such that the issuance of the preferred shares was a nullity, and breach of fiduciary duties.

[18] The stories described by the investors are most unfortunate. Many are seniors and pensioners who have invested their savings with Nelson. Some investors had notes that were rolled over and replaced with preference shares. Mr. McVey alleges that he made an original promissory note investment which was then converted arbitrarily and without his knowledge into preference shares. He alleges that the documents effecting the conversion did not contain his authentic signature.

[19] Mr. Styles states that he and his company invested approximately \$4.5 million in Nelson. He states that Mr. Boutet persuaded him to convert his promissory notes into preference shares by promising a 13.75% dividend rate, assuring him that the obligation of Nelson to repay would be treated the same or better than the promissory notes, and that they would have the same or a priority position to the promissory notes. He then received dividends at the 13.75% rate contrary to the 10% rate found in the company's articles. In addition, at the time of the conversion, Nelson was insolvent.

[20] In brief, Mr. Styles submits that:

- (a) the investment transactions were void because there was no prospectus contrary to the provisions of the *Securities Act* and the Styles were not accredited investors; the preferred shares were issued contrary to section 23(3) of the *OBCA* in that Nelson was insolvent at the relevant time and as such, the issuance was a nullity; and the conduct of the company and its principal was oppressive contrary to section 248 of the *OBCA*; and that
- (b) the Styles' claim is in respect of an undisputed agreement relating to the conversion of their promissory notes into preferred shares which agreement is enforceable separate and apart from any claim relating to the preferred shares.

The Issue

[21] Are any of the claims advanced by the preferred shareholders equity claims within section 2 of the *CCAA* such that they are to be placed in a separate class and are subordinated to the full recovery of all other creditors?

The Law

[22] The relevant provisions of the *CCAA* are as follows.

Section 2 of the *CCAA* states:

In this Act,

“Claim” means any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind that would be a claim provable within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*;

“Equity Claim” means a claim that is in respect of an equity interest, including a claim for, among others,

- (a) a dividend or similar payment,
- (b) a return of capital,

- (c) a redemption or retraction obligation,
- (d) a monetary loss resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest or from the rescission, or, in Quebec, the annulment, of a purchase or sale of an equity interest, or
- (e) contribution or indemnity in respect of a claim referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (d);”

“Equity Interest” means

- (a) in the case of a corporation other than an income trust, a share in the corporation — or a warrant or option or another right to acquire a share in the corporation — other than one that is derived from a convertible debt, and
- (b) in the case of an income trust, a unit in the income trust — or a warrant or option or another right to acquire a unit in the income trust — other than one that is derived from a convertible debt;

Section 6(8) states:

No compromise or arrangement that provides for the payment of an equity claim is to be sanctioned by the court unless it provides that all claims that are not equity claims are to be paid in full before the equity claim is to be paid.

Section 22.1 states:

Despite subsection 22(1) creditors having equity claims are to be in the same class of creditors in relation to those claims unless the court orders otherwise and may not, as members of that class, vote at any meeting unless the court orders otherwise.

[23] Section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (“*BIA*”) which is referenced in section 2 of the *CCAA* provides that a claim provable includes any claim or liability provable in proceedings under the Act by a creditor. Creditor is then defined as a person having a claim provable as a claim under the Act.

[24] Section 121(1) of the *BIA* describes claims provable. It states:

All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which the bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt's discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in proceedings under this Act.

[25] Historically, the claims and rights of shareholders were not treated as provable claims and ranked after creditors of an insolvent corporation in a liquidation. As noted by Laskin J.A. in *Re Central Capital Corporation*², on the insolvency of a company, the claims of creditors have always ranked ahead of the claims of shareholders for the return of their capital. This principle is premised on the notion that shareholders are understood to be higher risk participants who have chosen to tie their investment to the fortunes of the corporation. In contrast, creditors choose a lower level of exposure, the assumption being that they will rank ahead of shareholders in an insolvency. Put differently, amongst other things, equity investors bear the risk relating to the integrity and character of management.

[26] This treatment also has been held to encompass fraudulent misrepresentation claims advanced by a shareholder seeking to recover his investment: *Re Blue Range Resource Corp.*³ In that case, Romaine J. held that the alleged loss derived from and was inextricably intertwined with the shareholder interest. Similarly, in the United States, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in *Re Stirling Homex Corp.*⁴ concluded that shareholders, including those who had allegedly been defrauded, were subordinate to the general creditors when the company was insolvent. The Court stated that "the real party against which [the shareholders] are seeking relief is the body of

² (1996), 38 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).

³ 2000, 15 C.B.R. (4th) 169.

⁴ (1978) 579 F. 2d 206 (2nd Cir. Ct. of App.).

general creditors of their corporation. Whatever relief may be granted to them in this case will reduce the percentage which the general creditors will ultimately realize upon their claims.” *National Bank of Canada v. Merit Energy Ltd.*⁵ and *Earthfirst Canada Inc.*⁶ both treated claims relating to agreements that were collateral to equity claims as equity claims. These cases dealt with separate indemnification agreements and the issuance of flow through shares. The separate agreements and the ensuing claims were treated as part of one integrated transaction in respect of an equity interest. The case law has also recognized the complications and delay that would ensue if *CCAA* proceedings were mired in shareholder claims.

[27] The amendments to the *CCAA* came into force on September 18, 2009. It is clear that the amendments incorporated the historical treatment of equity claims. The language of section 2 is clear and broad. Equity claim means a claim in respect of an equity interest and includes, amongst other things, a claim for rescission of a purchase or sale of an equity interest. Pursuant to sections 6(8) and 22.1, equity claims are rendered subordinate to those of creditors.

[28] The Nelson filing took place after the amendments and therefore the new provisions apply to this case. Therefore, if the claims of the preferred shareholders are properly characterized as equity claims, the relief requested by Representative Counsel in his notice of motion should be granted.

⁵ (2001), 2001 CarswellAlta. 913, aff'd 2002 CarswellAlta 23 (Alta C.A.).

⁶ (2009) 2009 CarswellAlta 1069.

[29] Guidance on the appropriate approach to the issue of characterization was provided by the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Re Central Capital Corporation*⁷. Central Capital was insolvent and sought protection pursuant to the provisions of the *CCAA*. The appellants held preferred shares of Central Capital. The shares each contained a right of retraction, that is, a right to require Central Capital to redeem the shares on a fixed date and for a fixed price. One shareholder exercised his right of retraction and the other shareholder did not but both filed proofs of claim in the *CCAA* proceedings. In considering whether the two shareholders had provable debt claims, Laskin J.A. considered the substance of the relationship between the company and the shareholders. If the governing instrument contained features of both debt and equity, that is, it was hybrid in character, the court must determine the substance of the relationship between the company and the holder of the certificate. The Court examined the parties' intentions.

[30] In *Central Capital*, Laskin J.A. looked to the share purchase agreements, the conditions attaching to the shares, the articles of incorporation and the treatment given to the shares in the company's financial statements to ascertain the parties' intentions and determined that the claims were equity and not debt claims.

[31] In this case, there are characteristics that are suggestive of a debt claim and of an equity claim. That said, in my view, the preferred shareholders are, as their description implies, shareholders of Nelson and not creditors. In this regard, I note the following.

⁷ *Supra*, note 2.

- (a) Investors were given the option of investing in promissory notes or preference shares and opted to invest in shares. Had they taken promissory notes, they obviously would have been creditors. The preference shares carried many attractions including income tax advantages.
- (b) The investors had the right to receive dividends, a well recognized right of a shareholder.
- (c) The preference share conditions provided that on a liquidation, dissolution or winding up, the preferred shareholders ranked ahead of common shareholders. As in *Central Capital*, it is implicit that they therefore would rank behind creditors.
- (d) Although I acknowledge that the preferred shareholders did not receive copies of the financial statements, nonetheless, the shares were treated as equity in Nelson's financial statements and in its books and records.

[32] The substance of the arrangement between the preferred shareholders and Nelson was a relationship based on equity and not debt. Having said that, as I observed in *I. Waxman & Sons*.⁸, there is support in the case law for the proposition that equity may become debt. For instance, in that case, I held that a judgment obtained at the suit of a shareholder constituted debt. An analysis of the nature of the claims is therefore required. If the claims fall within the parameters of section 2 of the *CCAA*, clearly they are to be treated as equity claims and not as debt claims.

[33] In this case, in essence the claims of the preferred shareholders are for one or a combination of the following:

⁸ (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 1245.

- (a) declared but unpaid dividends;
- (b) unperformed requests for redemption;
- (c) compensatory damages for the loss resulting in the purchased preferred shares now being worthless and claimed to have been caused by the negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation of Nelson or of persons for whom Nelson is legally responsible; and
- (d) payment of the amounts due upon the rescission or annulment of the purchase or subscription for preferred shares.

[34] In my view, all of these claims fall within the ambit of section 2, are governed by sections 6(8) and 22.1 of the *CCAA*, and therefore do not constitute a claim provable for the purposes of the statute. The language of section 2 is clear and unambiguous and equity claims include “a claim that is in respect of an equity interest” and a claim for a dividend or similar payment and a claim for rescission. This encompasses the claims of all of the preferred shareholders including the Styles whose claim largely amounts to a request for rescission or is in respect of an equity interest. The case of *National Bank of Canada v. Merit Energy Ltd.*⁹ is applicable in regard to the latter. In substance, the Styles’ claim is for an equity obligation. At a minimum, it is a claim in respect of an equity interest as described in section 2 of the *CCAA*. Parliament’s intention is clear and the types of claims advanced in this case by the preferred shareholders are captured by the language of the amended statute. While some, and most notably Professor Janis Sarra¹⁰, advocated a statutory amendment that provided for some judicial


⁹ *Supra*, note 5.

¹⁰ “From Subordination to Parity: An International Comparison of Equity Securities Law Claims in Insolvency Proceedings” (2007) 16 *Int. Insolv. Rc.*, 181.

flexibility in cases involving damages arising from egregious conduct on the part of a debtor corporation and its officers, Parliament opted not to include such a provision. Sections 6(8) and 22.1 allow for little if any flexibility. That said, they do provide for greater certainty in the appropriate treatment to be accorded equity claims.

[35] There are two possible exceptions. Mr. McVey claims that his promissory note should never have been converted into preference shares, the conversion was unauthorized and that the signatures on the term sheets are not his own. If Mr. McVey's evidence is accepted, his claim would be qua creditor and not preferred shareholder. Secondly, it is possible that monthly dividends that may have been lent to Nelson by Larry Debono constitute debt claims. The factual record on these two possible exceptions is incomplete. The Monitor is to investigate both scenarios, consider a resolution of same, and report back to the court on notice to any affected parties.

[36] Additionally, the claims procedure will have to be amended. The Monitor should consider an appropriate approach and make a recommendation to the court to accommodate the needs of the stakeholders. The relief requested in the notice of motion is therefore granted subject to the two aforesaid possible exceptions.


Pepall J.

CITATION: Nelson Financial Group Ltd., 2010 ONSC 6229
COURT FILE NO.: 10-8630-00CL
DATE: 20101116

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BETWEEN:

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**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Pepall J.

Released: November 16, 2010